Are the Germans saving themselves to death?

"Savings, regarded by some as a virtue and by others as a slippery slope to stinginess, has become a contemporary political topic that cannot be ignored. As I write these words, German media is abuzz with the remarks of the mayor of Schwäbisch Gmünd, who proposed that, as a budget-saving measure, students be engaged in cleaning schools. According to preliminary calculations, this could lead to savings of around 200,000-250,000 euros annually. (Die Welt, 07.10.2025). This case is anecdotal; however, the context of austerity politics is much broader. For instance, we can mention the anti-austerity movements in Europe (Greece, Spain, Italy, UK, Germany) as a consequence of the economic crisis of 2008 (Rak, 2018). The echoes of these protests are still present today, and although they occur with less intensity, the issues they were organized against remain unresolved. In the chronology of European crises, the anti-austerity protests should be placed partially parallel to the migration crisis and alongside the yellow vest protests in France as the last surge before the onset of the pandemic era. Although since the pandemic the multitude of political problems and the complexity of their nature seem to be deepening, the question of reducing public spending and managing public debt remains in the background."

"This is linked to a popular concept that was at the center of public debate during Angela Merkel's government, namely the management of expectations. Given the fact that contemporary governments have a wide range of financial instruments at their disposal for state borrowing, the key question becomes how much does a well-functioning society need to be happy? It seems that a certain scale of prosperity that a state can achieve becomes dangerous from the perspective of political stability and economic optimization. Germany's problems with migration resulting from social policy appear to be just one manifestation of this phenomenon. The economic growth itself, which has rarely been disputed in its positive character, is becoming a subject of criticism from many sides, among which the proponents of so-called "degrowth" are just one possibility (Saito, 2024)."

"With this in mind, an interesting issue arises when comparing the social welfare and economic growth situations in Germany and Poland. The phrase that Germany is an "analog state" (Elliot, 2024) often appears in public debate. Indeed, when looking at the daily activities performed through digital technology in Poland and Germany, Poland undoubtedly wins, primarily due to internet services, communication, and a developed mobile banking sector. To give just one vivid example – nearly 7 million transactions are made daily along the Vistula River using the popular BLIK system. At the same time, cash remains in Germany something that one cannot really do without when making daily payment transactions. On one hand, this situation seems unequivocally beneficial for the Republic and positions our country as a digital leader in the region. Coupled with a continuous economic growth over the past thirty years, recently captured on the emblematic cover of The Economist (2025), the image of Poland as a development leader becomes clear and distinct. However, to temper the enthusiasm that emerges from various sides of the public discourse, it is worth noting a deeper dimension in comparing Poland and Germany, not only as our neighbor but also as a representative of so-called "rich Western countries." It appears that the savings of the Germans, pervasive in public policies, infrastructure investments, and the maintenance of public administration, alongside the simultaneous reduction of public debt and the allocation of capital in the form of reserves, stand in stark contrast to the Polish approach. We see that in Poland public debt is rising, public spending is increasing, and citizens' savings compared to German society are very modest. If we view Polish growth from this perspective, for instance, the recent actions of the NBP focused on accumulating gold reserves seem justified. It is not unfounded to observe, which occasionally arises in public debate, that Poland lacks the capital that forms the basis of wealth in developed countries."

"The problem can thus be formulated as follows: Are the Germans "saving" themselves to death, or is Poland like a Potemkin village with a splendid facade and impressive statistics, but lacking deeper economic stability? "

The divergence between the Polish and German approaches becomes fully apparent when also considering employee privileges, social insurance issues, medical care, and many other matters that affect the daily lives of citizens. The category of quality of life is burdened with a certain paradox. On one hand, everyone knows and can assess their own level of quality of life that they consider satisfactory; however, from an objective standpoint, it is impossible to define universally, let alone effectively measure the so-called "quality of life." The problem in answering the question about the quality of life in the mentioned examples illustrates this well. The backdrop of this entire issue is the enduring stereotype associated with Poles known as the so-called "Polnische Wirtschaft" – an economy far from the standards of economic optimization.

To show that this matter is neither predetermined nor black-and-white, but has a gradient of gray and will dynamically change in the near future, let us look at the recent amendment to the German constitution (Menéndez, 2024). It is significant and represents the sign of the times, as it involves the constitutionally regulated removal of constraints on public debt and the expansion of budgetary possibilities. This maneuver fits into the increasingly popular global trend of constitutionalizing politics. The constitution, instead of creating formal-legal frameworks for the functioning of a democratic system, becomes a tool of politics, within which amendments to the constitution become weapons of political decision-making.

The broader context of the recent amendment to the constitution can be better understood by returning to what I started with above. The economic crisis of 2008 triggered an avalanche of mechanisms aimed at mitigating its effects. The concept of "austerity consensus" became significant, based on which the German constitution was amended in 2009 by introducing a debt brake (Schuldenbremse). The annual structural deficit could be a maximum of 0.35% of GDP.

The Federal Constitutional Court declared the federal budget for 2023 and the draft for 2024 unconstitutional (Heise, 2024). So what if the budget cannot be adjusted to the constitution? The constitution must be adjusted to the budget. In 2025, after 16 years of the constitutional debt brake, a new amendment was introduced to the constitution. The process of introducing the amendment was record-fast (about 20 days) and was politically carried out by the fragile coalition of CDU/CSU and SPD along with the Greens at the end of the 20th Bundestag term (Menéndez, 2024). The content of the amendment concerned the possibility of increasing defense spending above 1% of GDP and launching an infrastructure fund worth a staggering 500 billion euros. These maneuvers show how flexible the German constitution is from both procedural and substantive perspectives, especially in understanding the content of constitutional provisions. It is obvious that the war in the east was an important justification for the change in approach to the state budget, but at the same time, one cannot disagree with the observation of the American press: If you can no longer sell diesel engine cars, you might be tempted to produce diesel tanks (Kazmin, 2025).

Two conclusions come to mind at the end. First, Germany seems to be moving away from a policy based on the principles of austerity consensus. A sign of this is the recent amendment to the constitution. Although it has a very concrete effect on reality, it can also be viewed symbolically as proof of the significance of the problem, which finds its reflection in the text of the Grundgesetz. Second, the flexibility of the constitution becomes a key element influencing the conduct of state policy at the highest level of importance. It seems justified to direct the attention of experts to the far-reaching consequences of "flexibilizing" a document that was originally intended to provide the framework for legislative flexibility.

This entry was created during a scholarship stayof the Polish Historical Missionin Würzburg in October 2025 as part of the project: "Contemporary German Politico-Legal Thought in the Face of the Flexibility of Constitutions"

Sources:

Elliot, L. (2024). The German problem? It’s an analogue country in a digital world, The Guardian 01.09.2024.; Heise, A. (2024). Austerity and the political economy of the German debt brake, University of Hamburg, Center for Economic and Sociological Studies, number 106.; Kazmin, A. (2025). German Defence Splurge Could Revive Italy’s Manufacturers, Says Minister. Financial Times, 23 March 2025.; Menéndez, A. J. (2024). Editorial: rewriting the German fundamental law in a blitz, “European Law Open” no. 3, pp. 687-704.; Rak, J. (2018). Theorizing Cultures of Political Violence in Times of Austerity: Studying Social Movements in Comparative Perspective. New York and London: Routledge.; Saito, K. (2024). Slow Down: the Degrowth Manifesto. New York: Astra House.; Die Welt (07.10.2025). “Would relieve us financially” – CDU politician urges students to clean schools.

#4 Ł. Perlikowski (08.10.2025). Are Germans saving themselves to death?. https://lukaszperlikowski.pl/blog

*Photograph: Brandenburg Gate, Berlin 2022 (personal archive)