Russian world through the keyhole

Soon it will be a year since I had the opportunity to look through the keyhole at what the russkij mir might look like. Transnistria and Moldova were struggling with problems in electricity supply at the beginning of 2025, which severely affected the residents and the entire economy. These events, in the context of the pro-Western aspirations of Moldova's President Maia Sandu and the recently adopted constitutional change resulting from the pro-EU outcome of the referendum, seemed to herald an impending breakthrough.status quo, and consequently the resolution of the problematic issue of the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria. As the following months showed, nothing of the sort occurred. Therefore, when another breakthrough was predicted related to the "blockade" of Transnistria by a coordinated action of Moldova and Ukraine at the beginning of January 2026, I already knew the proper measure with which to approach such revelations. If one were to let their imagination run wild, one could venture to state that such intense political actions surrounding an issue as sensitive as Transnistria, if they were to occur in the context of any other region in Europe, would inevitably lead to an avalanche of undesirable consequences, including military conflict. However, in this case, it is different. On one hand, one could say, as Thomas Mann did, that this is a case in which one simply: "can get used to the fact that one cannot get used to it" (Mann, 1956), referring to the instability of the region. On the other hand, one could see the cause here as the russkij mir – a multi-faceted way of life of individuals in society, anchored in mentality (Holzer, Balik, 2009), combined with the way power is exercised, based on the discord between official ideology and unofficial realities of governance.

This experience from my travels to Moldova and Transnistria, although incomplete and cursory in every respect, gave me a lot to think about regarding the inadequacy and lack of effectiveness of political analyses and forecasts produced in the West. If they overlook certain essential factors on the micro-example of Transnistria, how inaccurate must they be on the macro-level of the Russian Federation? This issue seems very significant, especially in the context of preparing for various scenarios concerning the future of Russia after the Russo-Ukrainian war and after the presumably distant, yet biologically necessary departure of President Putin (Łuniewski, 2025; Masala, 2025).

A key factor that may escape the attention of analysts is so difficult to grasp because it lies beyond the reach of political theories and the analysis of official data. It is difficult on one hand to conceptualize, and on the other hand, the difficulty pertains to the possibility of measuring it. The only source from which one can acquire this particular knowledge is conversations with people. The interview technique still seems to be a unique source of knowledge that allows for the acquisition of knowledge of a strictly counter-intuitive nature. It is hard to name otherwise, for example, the situation related to the phenomenon of corruption. In the West, it is fought against in every possible way, and its occurrence is always associated with a loss of credibility. Where traces of corruption appear, we can most likely expect unrest and negative consequences of a decline in social trust. In political systems affected by the russkij mir, we are faced with the opposite situation – corruption can serve as a foundation for political stability. It is beneficial for both parties in the transaction and cements the system of interdependence. Another element that is not obvious for official analyses is the tightness of the border. Smuggling at the border between the MRN and Moldova is so obvious that it is visible even to the naked eye for external observers. The population of Transnistria freely moves to engage in professional activities in Moldova. The Republic of Moldova itself resemblesde facto a federation with autonomous regions like the MRN and Gagauzia and a pluralistic society, which includes: Moldovans, Romanians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Russians, and Bulgarians. Russian influence on the shape of the social base is unquestionable. A large part of the population, including a significant portion of the intelligentsia, consists of people with familial roots in the Soviet Union, identifying as Moldovans of Russian descent. The official language in Moldova is Romanian, but in Transnistria, this specific variant of Romanian is written in Cyrillic. Meanwhile, 150 thousand people speak the Gagauz language (of Turkish genealogy). For a relatively short time (since 1989), it has been written in the Latin alphabet. The citizens living in this culturally-ethnically diverse mosaic have developeda modus vivendi., which allows for relatively normal functioning on a daily basis. Within the academic environment, one can encounter opinions that pulling Transnistria towards the pro-European side could occur through increased streams of funding that could elevate the civilizational level of the Transnistrian population (Teosa, 2022). It can also be learned that the military stationed in the PMR, although undoubtedly commanded by forces ultimately based in the Kremlin, consists of soldiers from the indigenous population, and consequently, are likely more reluctant to spill the blood of their kin and neighbors.

In summary, in this extremely externally presenting quasi-totalitarian pseudo-state, normal life is led by ordinary people who, accustomed to the fact that one cannot get used to anything, operate according to conventions closely tied to the mentality of the russkij mir, where the dissonance between official ideology and unofficial reality is evident. Understanding this dual approach is key to gaining a complete picture of the situation. By analogy, this conclusion can also be applied to the case of the Russian Federation.In a commentary on the scenario of democratization in Russia, we can read that: "[...] The West must direct its message to ordinary Russians. Show them that they can develop and prosper just as in the early years of Putin's rule, but without aggressive politics and further wars" (Łuniewski, 2025, p. 201). This stems from the principle of the pendulum, according to which the shift towards democratization occurs evenly following an authoritarian deviation, etc. (Łuniewski, 2025, p. 181). For rational management of the fluctuations in the Russian political system to be possible, it is necessary to have cognitive openness to the situations of Eastern societies. Awareness of the mass occurrence of disinformation and cognitive warfare instruments (Bryc, Domańska, 2024) is essential here, but on the other hand, condemning or ignoring any content depicting life in the Russian Federation is truly shooting oneself in the foot. Russkij mir poses a challenge not only as a hostile project imposing a form of political and social order but primarily, it is a cognitive challenge.

Perlikowski, Ł. Falkowski, R., Pląskowski, F. (2025). Internal and External Factors of Political Stability in the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria. New Eastern Policy vol. 4 (48).https://czasopisma.marszalek.com.pl/npw/28/840; Perlikowski, Ł., Pląskowski, F. (2025). The Paradox of Transnistria, New Eastern Europe.https://new.org.pl/5310,paradoks_naddniestrza.html

Sources:

Bryc, A., Domańska, M. (2024). Russia in the Trenches of Cognitive War. New Eastern Europe no. 1(3).; Holzer, J., Balik, S. (2009). Post-Communist Undemocratic Regimes. Political Thought Center.;Łuniewski, M. (2025). Russia. From Collapse to Fascist Dictatorship. Scenarios for the Future 2026-2036. Glimmers.;Mann, T. (1956). The Magic Mountain. Reader.;Masala, C. (2025).If Russia Wins. A Scenario. Atlantic Books.;Teosa, V., (2022). Using the Concept of "Human Security" in the Study of the Post-Military Stage of the Transnistrian Settlement: Problem Statement. Yearbook of the Laboratory for the Transnistrian Conflict Analysis.

#8 Ł. Perlikowski (27.01.2026). Russkij mir through the keyhole. https://lukaszperlikowski.pl/blog

*Photograph: Tiraspol, Transnistria, 2025 (Personal archive)